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The Larger Europe: Technological
Convergence and Labour Migration
Ingenue Team*
We investigate the long-run growth of Europe in the world economy. The
research covers the first half of the XXIst century. The basic trends that will shape
the growth regime in the global economy are the demographic transition and the
diffusion of technological progress. We use the framework of INGENUE, an OLG
model that divides the world in ten broad regions. Hypotheses are elaborated on
the basic trends and discussed in an historical perspective. Structural changes are
then introduced into INGENUE to make prospective scenarios.
A baseline scenario is built to outline the main macroeconomic features of the
broad regions. This scenario being used as a benchmark is deliberately conserva-
tive as far as structural and institutional changes are concerned. It depicts Western
Europe as an ageing low-growth region, accumulating net foreign assets and enjo-
ying an appreciating real exchange rate. These are the characteristics of a perma-
nent creditor in a world growth regime supported by capital mobility.
The frontiers of Europe are investigated in the last part of the paper by means
of two alternative scenarios. First it is assumed that EU enlargement accelerates the
technological catch-up of Eastern Europe and boosts growth. Second labour mobi-
lity is simulated. Because the cost of financing public retirement is higher in Western
Europe, a policy of immigration is implemented to eschew the decline of the labour
force. Both the beneficial effects on Western Europe and the adverse effects on the
regions of emigration are displayed.
L’ÉLARGISSEMENT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE. 
CONVERGENCE ET MOBILITÉ DU TRAVAIL
Nous explorons la croissance tendancielle de l’Europe au sein de l’économie
mondiale. La recherche couvre la première moitié du XXIe siècle. Les principaux
facteurs du régime de croissance vont être la transition démographique et la diffu-
sion du progrès technique. Nous utilisons le modèle INGENUE qui découpe le monde
en dix grandes régions. Des hypothèses sont formulées sur ces facteurs et discutée
dans une perspective historique. Les changements structurels impliqués par ces
hypothèses sont introduits dans INGENUE pour faire des scénarios prospectifs.
Un scénario de référence est construit qui décrit les principales caractéristiques
macroéconomiques des grandes régions. Parce qu’il veut être la base à partir de
laquelle sont étudiées des variantes, ce scénario est conservateur dans les
changements structurels et institutionnels qu’il incorpore. Il décrit l’Europe occiden-
tale comme une région vieillissante à croissance faible, qui accumule des actifs
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nets sur l’étranger et qui bénéficie d’une appréciation réelle de l’euro. Ce sont les
caractéristiques d’un créancier permanent qui tire parti de la mobilité du capital.
Deux scénarios illustrent les frontières de l’Europe. D’abord, on suppose que
l’élargissement vers l’Est accélère le rattrapage technologique de l’Europe de l’Est
et donne une impulsion à la croissance. Ensuite, on simule une politique d’immi-
gration en Europe de l’Ouest pour compenser le déclin de la population active et
modérer l’augmentation du coût du financement public des retraites. Le modèle met
en évidence et quantifie les effets bénéfiques en Europe de l’Ouest et les effets
contraires dans les zones d’émigration.
Classification JEL: C68, D91, F21, F22, H55.
INTRODUCTION
In the early years of the XXIst century the world we are living in is in flux.
Globalisation is deepening. It is no longer restricted to international exchanges
in trade and finance. Technology transfers gain momentum. The countries able
to assimilate its arcane can jump several stages in the international division of
labour in some sectors and areas while still being in utter backwardness in others.
Heterogeneity makes their development highly unbalanced but it fosters poten-
tial opportunities for both foreign and advanced domestic firms. Management
systems, accounting and information standards are also part of the process of glo-
balisation. Multinational firms are no longer exclusively Western and Japanese
spreading world-wide. They are challenged by multinationals originating in
other parts of the world, making competition fierce in truly world-wide markets.
Therefore the conjecture of a growth regime significantly different from the
past stages of capitalist development can be contemplated. After World War II
only in Western Europe the catching-up process to the leading country was able
to be interactive amongst the converging countries, making an integrated region.
Growth in Japan and in the so-called Asian dragons was both domestic and
export-led, without reciprocal dynamic relationships. Exports were essentially
driven to the US market. Domestic production was import substitute from the US
and Western Europe. In the first half of the XXIst century, for reasons underlined
below, multiple poles of integrated development will rise. This makes world
growth a regime that requires a model linking together vastly populated regions
of the globe, catching up at their own speed.
To study what the world growth regime will stand for in the next decades and
what the scope of Europe is likely to be, section I depicts the demographic and
technological forces that will foster convergence in the present half century. Sec-
tion II introduces the conjecture of the world growth regime, discussing the cru-
cial hypotheses and outlining the INGENUE 2 model. Section III describes the
macroeconomic features of the baseline scenario and the place of Europe in a
changing world. Section IV defines alternative prospects in the relationships of
Western Europe with its neighbourhood. One is faster convergence in Eastern
Europe due to economic integration; the other is a flow of labour migrations from
the East and the South (the Mediterranean contour and Sub-Saharan Africa).
Finally the paper concludes on the benefits for Europe from being a pole of
attraction.
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THE NEW GREAT TRANSFORMATION: 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CONVERGENCE IN THE XXIST CENTURY
Growth in the world economy is shaped by secular trends in its most structural
long-run determinants. Two factors stand out. The first is the change in the
demographic structure in the different parts of the world. The second is the dif-
fusion of technological progress, as expressed by trends in total factor produc-
tivity growth. These factors have always been prevalent in the rise of capitalism
worldwide. Mobility of labour, capital and ideas has intermeshed. The stages of
capitalist development are connected with different directions of this mobility.
Demographic expansion, migration and economic development
In the late XIXth century there was an impetus to globalisation prodded by a
joint expansion of European capital and labour in under-populated overseas ter-
ritories. The momentum was impressive indeed. For the average of the years
1880-1913 the net flow of capital exports for the total of 13 European countries
reached 3.5% of their aggregate GDP. In comparison the same measure of overall
capital mobility was 2% in the 1930’s and 1.5% in the thirty mighty years after
World War II. It rose again after the first oil shock to 2.7% in the last decade of
the XXth century (Taylor [1996]).
The most striking feature of the world growth regime in the late XIXth century
however was the complementarity between capital export from Europe and the
emigration of its population. In the UK 3% of the initial population emigrated in
the 1880’s, 5.2% in the 1890’s plagued by a severe recession, 2% in the growth
years of the first decade of the XXth century. In Spain the figures were respec-
tively 1.5, 6, 5.2% and in Sweden 2.9, 7.2 and 3.5%. These figures were very
high for countries with a long tradition of capitalist development. But in the lands
of immigration they were properly astonishing. Indeed in the 1890’s the popula-
tion swelled 9% with immigration in addition to the natural expansion in the US,
17% in Australia and 25% in Argentina.
It was a transplant of the European labour force that was young, productive
and attracted by higher wages or entrepreneurial income as settlers. Because of
capital imports, the expatriated labour force benefited from fast technological
progress in railways and sea transportation, converted into low costs of the pri-
mary commodities entering into European manufacturing industries. Therefore
the labour migration of the time entailed an international division of labour
whereby the real cost of wage goods diminished in Europe, while emigration
helped sustaining an increase in real wages after the turn of the XXth century.
Meanwhile capital exports from Europe and capital accumulation in Europe
occurred in alternate phases of the financial cycle, preserving a stable long-run
interest rate.
World War I and the ensuing monetary disorders, culminating in the world
depression that fragmented international trade broke this world growth regime.
It was not until the 1960’s that another pattern of world growth emerged. It was
very different from the former. Huge institutional changes after World War II
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had rooted a self-sustaining growth process in Western countries. It was based
upon a virtuous circle encompassing the baby boom, fast productivity gains,
matching real wage increases, progressive social transfers and mass consump-
tion. In the 1960’s trade opening under sequential GATT rounds enhanced a con-
vergence club in OECD countries. This process entailed primarily domestic
migrations from rural to urban areas. It was supplemented by immigration from
the so-called Third World after completion of decolonisation. This immigration
was stirred on the supply side by the demographic explosion in the Third World,
by the dislocation of traditional agricultural structures and the deterioration in
the terms of trade that spread mass poverty in the mega-cities. On the demand
side it was attracted by a chronic shortage of low-skilled labour in the fast-
growing industries of consumer durables. This migration pattern went on to the
early 1980’s and in some respect still goes on chiefly in North America and to a
lesser extent in Europe.
New Prospect between 
demography and economy in the XXIst century
After the European demographic expansion of the XIXth century and the
speed-up of population growth in the second half of the XXth century, the demo-
graphic transition will imprint the first half of the XXIst century. It is a sequential
and lengthy process of ageing. The developed countries, the Eastern European
countries, Russia and ten years later China, will be ageing from the top of the age
structure. Most of the developing world is ageing from the bottom of the pyramid.
When the world is broken in ten regions, according to the nomenclature
adopted in INGENUE 2, a sharp contrast will arise in the rate of growth of the
labour force. It will decline throughout the half century in Russia (very fast),
Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Japan. It will decline more moderately in
North America (after 2010) and China (after 2020). It will decelerate but grow
until 2050 in South America, India and the Mediterranean countries (outside
Europe). The most atypical region is Africa where the labour force will hardly
decelerate at all (Figure 1). In the XIXth century Europe possessed both the capi-
tal and the human resources to conquer the world. In the post-World War II era,
OECD countries were leaders in the growth regime. In the upcoming decades the
opposite will occur. Emerging market countries have the potential for a new
growth regime based upon a widespread, albeit not generalised, catching-up.
The conjecture is that the size and the dynamism of the population in large
continental countries will become the preponderant factor in domestic develop-
ment because their governments are aware of the need for investing in infrastruc-
ture, health and education.
As the leading OECD countries concentrate the largest part of world capital, the
growth regime will depend on international capital rather than labour mobility.
An intergenerational transfer of resources via capital export from the rich ageing
countries to the labour force growing countries will make the world regions
strongly interdependent. We already advocated this approach in former papers
based upon INGENUE 1, the first version of the model. Indeed the idea of a
mutually advantageous exchange, whereby wealthy households in rich countries
export their saving to growth-hungry countries, is the core insight in the INGENUE
project. Figure 2 illustrates why this intergenerational exchange will arise.
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One can see that the proportion of high savers in total population follows a
wave pattern that propagates from one region of the world to the next through
the decades. The ratio culminates first in Japan as soon as 1995 and remains at
high level until 2030. Then North America will have its maximum in 2010 and
Western Europe in 2015, Eastern Europe, Russia and China in 2030. All are
regions where the labour force will decline and thus hamper growth in the future.
On the contrary the regions found on figure 1 as the potentially fast-growing
regions will see a progressive ageing leading to an increase of the high savers
ratio which will not culminate before 2050. It follows that saving will flow from
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Figure 1. Working age population annual growth rate 1960-2050
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Figure 2. High Savers Ratio 
(age group 45-69 yrs in percentage of total population) 1960-2050
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early high savers to late high savers in the coming decades. However, for this
scenario to arise, an engine of growth is required. This is the international diffu-
sion of technological progress.
The spread of technological progress
A synthetic measure of technological progress for a whole economy is total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) at constant prices. Estimating TFP is an appallingly difficult
task for the ten world regions of INGENUE 2. We define TFP as a Hicksian neutral
technological progress in a Solow growth model. It means that there exists a pro-
duction frontier shifting over time. In such a framework the aggregate product is a
function of the services of capital and labour and of technological progress defined
as TFP. Therefore the latter is computed with the use of the production function.
The stock of capital and the national account data were drawn from Heston-
Summers data base [2002]. They were aggregated in $1996 for the regions of the
INGENUE breakdown. Ad hoc adjustments were made for missing data. The elasti-
city parameter for the impact of capital in the production function was held the
same at 1/3 in all regions. Then total factor productivity was computed for every
year of the period 1951-2001. The results are exhibited on figure 3.
Figure 3. Total Factor Productivity: 1950-2000 (1996 $)
In the second half of the XXth century North America has always been the world
leader. Western Europe and Japan were catching up until 1990. From a TFP equal to
about 66% of US level in 1950, Europe reached 90% in 1990. From 50% Japan
reached 75%. Then the trend changed abruptly. Producing and diffusing the use of
IT in the larger service sector the US has been able to speed up its TFP growth. In the
meantime Europe was not able to follow suit and Japan stalled completely. There-
fore the gap has widened for the first time since World War II. One can also
observe the impact of the oil crises on countries which subsequently suffered
repeated debt constraints. In Latin America TFP has been stagnant since 1975 after
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a solid growth in the 20 years before. This profile contrasts markedly with the
Asian performance. TFP took off in 1980 in China when reforms were launched. It
has persistently accelerated since. It did also in the mid-1980’s in India where it has
shown a hefty profile in the 1990’s and beyond. Finally no take off has arisen in
Africa after decolonisation. Combined with the high increase in population growth
depicted on figure 1, it means that GDP per capita actually declined, plunging the
overwhelming majority of the population in abject poverty.
THE CONJECTURE OF A WORLD GROWTH REGIME
The insight delivered by the above short review on world growth is that coun-
tries catch up unequally. The conditions of catching-up depends on social con-
ditions that cannot be embedded in macroeconomic models (Abramovitz
[1987]). However the change in demographic structures and the process of dif-
ferential convergence in TFP must be depicted in models dedicated to explore the
long run.
A provocative mechanism was proposed by Lucas [2000] to explain both the
divergence in real income per capita between countries for a considerable period
of time, then a convergence that might occur in the present century. This mecha-
nism is worth considering.
The takeoff of individual countries starts at random. After the initial shock
they follow a growth regime à la Solow. The trend of their total factor produc-
tivity is the faster, the larger the distance of their income per capita to that of the
leader. This dynamic leads to a convergence toward the productivity level of the
leader. Therefore the later a country begins its takeoff, the faster it can grow.
World growth is just a weighted average of individual trajectories.
Still the speedup of technological revolutions is another stylised fact that
shape trends of productivity gains. A suggestion to model this feature is the fol-
lowing: the probability that a particular country takes off at a particular time is
an increasing function of world income per capita. The latter is a proxy for the
stock of technological knowledge already accumulated by the countries that pre-
ceded newcomers in the technological age (Temple [1999]).
This assumption rests on the diffusion of technological progress. The know-
ledge invented somewhere is a non-rival good. It can be used anywhere with the
caveat that relevant institutions and policies have been established. In embo-
dying both the faster growth in a late takeoff and a higher probability of takeoffs
as long as the world becomes more technologically knowledgeable, Lucas shows
that a clever calibration can deliver interesting simulations. During a long a
period of two centuries after the first industrial revolution, income inequalities
between countries widen; then they will shrink in the XXIst century.
Crucial hypotheses on world growth
How can we accommodate this suggestion in the INGENUE framework?
Figure 3 gave the path of TFP for the second half of the XXth century. It exhibits
partial catching up of the different world regions to North America. This
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catching-up was interrupted in the 1990’s by the IT revolution which erupted ear-
lier in the US. We assume that North America will remain the technological
leader until 2050, that the diffusion of IT will be completed in the whole economy
and that there will be no further technological revolution in the baseline scenario.
Therefore North America TFP will return to its long-run growth trend of 1.5%
per year. With a 2/3 share of labour income in GDP, it means a 2.25% steady
growth in labour productivity.
For the rest of the world there will be a region-specific catching-up process in
TFP. The differential speed of catching up reflects the discrepancies in the social
and institutional conditions of assimilating IT in different parts of the world,
combined with the levels of TFP already reached.
The level of total factor productivity in the zone at the technological frontier
(North America) is A1, t. It is supposed to grow at 1.5% per year:
 with  The diffusion of technological progress
to a zone i is given by the following equation:
The first bracket captures the speed-up in the rate of technological progress,
due to the shortening of diffusion in technological innovations. It means that λ
is an accelerator to the convergence in the growth rates (the chosen value is
0.001) The second bracket embodies a brake due to the difficulties to create the
social conditions proper to assure a speedy diffusion. μi is the brake factor to the
convergence in level that is specific to each region. There is a caveat however.
To make account for the attractiveness of Europe upon its neighbour regions, we
assume that these regions will converge to the European target. As a result:
Western Europe, Japan, China, India and South America will converge to
North America.
Eastern Europe, Russia, Mediterranean world, Africa will converge to
Western Europe.
Table 1. Exogenous Catching up (μ values): Baseline Scenario
Figure 4 gathers the profiles of TFP in the world regions of the INGENUE 2
model. It shows that Western Europe and Japan resume their slow catching-up,
meaning that they absorb the IT revolution after North America. The takeoff in
China and India, which had already started in the 1990’s, will gain momentum.
The rise of these continental countries to the status of prominent powers will
attract whole regions (Chinese and Indian worlds) into commercial and financial
integration. Eastern Europe will also be a fast-growing region due to its partici-
pation to the European Union. We take a dimmer view of the other regions. A
relatively slow catching up is assumed in South America and the Mediterranean
countries where there are perennial difficulties in establishing efficient market
institutions, in promoting a large class of entrepreneurs and in generating non-
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corrupt and competent governments. The same arises more seriously in Russia
where the catastrophic decline of the population is a further handicap. Finally we
are more pessimistic about Africa where we assume no catching-up in level of
TFP. Yet the rise in TFP at the same rate of the leading region, even if it will entail
no catching-up, is a marked improvement on the last quarter of a century which
has seen no progress at all and thus a relative setback on the rest of the world.
The profiles in TFP (figure 4) are combined with the ones in the labour force.
The latter are given by the profiles of the working age population (figure 1)
adjusted for age-specific rates of participation in the labour market. Adjusting
finally the age profile of the labour force with a time and region-invariant age-
efficiency profile, one gets the main exogenous factors of growth embodied in
the INGENUE 2 model.
Figure 4. Total Factor Productivity: 1950-2100 (percentage of “North America” level) 
BOX. Non-technical overview of the INGENUE 2 model1
The world is compounded of 10 regions: North America (including Australia and
New Zealand), Western Europe, Japan, Eastern Europe, Russian World (including
Ukraine Bielorussia and Central Asia), “China world” (China and other East Asian
countries excluding Japan),“Indian World” (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka), “Latina world” (South and Central America and the Caribbean), Medi-
terranean (Non-European Mediterranean countries, Near and Middle East coun-
tries), Africa (Sub-Saharan Africa).
Overlapping generations: 21 generations overlap. Unit time 5 years, hence the
maximum life span is 105 years.17 cohorts of adults and 4 cohorts of young (under
20). Cost per child proportional to the consumption of their parents. Exogenous
labour supply adjusted for an age-specific participation ratio in each region.
Macroeconomic framework:
Household behaviour: life cycle hypothesis + voluntary bequest left to children
at age T subject to survival until that age. In the budget constraint, the expenditure
side encompasses the consumption (costs of children included) and saving of each
1950 1980 2010 2040 20701960 1990 2020 2050 20801970 2000 2030 2060 2090 2100
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individual of age a at period t. On the income side, there is the financial income on
accumulated saving (if the individual of age a – 1 at time t – 1 has survived between
t –1 and t) corrected by the survival probability of generation age a – 1. This adjust-
ment amounts to the mechanism of a perfect annuity market that pools death risk
due to the uncertain lifetime of individuals. There is also a non-financial income
which depends on the age of the individual respective to threshold ages: net labour
income (after social security taxes) modulated by an age-efficiency profile for peo-
ple in full labour activity; a mix of labour income and pension benefits for people
partially retired (reduced labour activity); full pension benefits for people entirely
retired. The lifetime utility program is maximised under the intertemporal budget
constraint, taking prices, social contributions and benefits as given. (Modigliani
[1986]).
Public sector. It is confined to a public Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension scheme
in all regions. It operates under a defined-benefit rule. It pays a proportion of the cur-
rent net wage (replacement ratio) to retirees. It is financed by a payroll tax on labor
income. The exogenous parameters are the retirement age and the replacement ratio.
They are region-specific. The contribution rate is determined so as to balance the
budget period by period.
Production system. Goods are heterogeneous. In each region there is an interme-
diate goods sector. It uses labor and capital to produce a region-specific intermediate
good with a constant return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function. The final
goods sector is the product of a CES combination of a domestic intermediate good
and a foreign intermediate good imported by the region from a world market (Backus
et al. [1995]). This homogenous world good is “produced” by a fictive world pro-
ducer as the output of a CES combination of all intermediate goods exported by the
regions. All production functions are augmented by TFP coefficients.
Firm behaviour. In each type of sector, firms act on competitive markets. They
maximise their profit under their production constraint, taking prices as given. In the
domestic intermediate good sector the constraint is intertemporal, since the produc-
tion function depends on the stock of capital which is depreciated and accumulated.
Intermediate goods producers thus maximise net present value of future cash flows,
i.e. production value minus wage cost and capital cost. The latter depends on the
depreciation rate, which is itself affected by international capital market imperfec-
tions. The depreciation rate is higher in debtor regions. More precisely the higher
their net foreign debt ratio to their stock of capital, the higher the depreciation rate in
those regions. Therefore this debt constraint increases the required gross rate of
return on capital in debtor regions, which in turn lowers the demand for capital and
thus the equilibrium capital/labour ratio resulting from the first-order condition.
Other type producers face a more simple maximisation problem. Domestic goods
producers and the world producer maximise current profit subject to their CES pro-
duction functions.
General equilibrium. The capital stock in each region, the age distribution of
saving in each region, the initial prices of domestic commodities are the initial con-
ditions. Exogenous variables and parameters are: the demographic profiles in each
region that are outputs of the demographic upstream model, the coefficients of the
TFP determination in intermediary and final sector of each region, the social security
policy parameters in each region. The competitive world equilibrium stems from five
set of equations: intertemporal utility maximisation of households, intertemporal
profit maximisation of firms in intermediate goods sectors, period profit maximiza-
tion of firms in final goods sectors, period profit maximisation of the world producer,
market clearing conditions. The markets for intermediate goods, final goods, labor
in each region and the market for the world intermediate good are cleared in each
period. These equations determine all relative equilibrium prices expressed in a com-
mon numeraire, which is the price of the intermediate good in North America set
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MAIN MACROECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
OF BASELINE SCENARIO: EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD
The baseline scenario is the outcome of a long and weary process of calibra-
tion. To put the model on an acceptable track on the projection phase starting in
2000, an adjustment must be made. It is why the model computation shall begin
at an initial date as far in the past as the data permit it. The initialisation is the
five-year period beginning in 1950 where initial stocks of capital, household
assets and an age distribution of savings are estimated.
An opening of the world economy is supposed from 1955 onwards. The fur-
ther degree of opening follows the historical data on country shares in world
trade and country ratios of openness and then aggregated to the INGENUE regions.
Historical data for total factor productivity are injected up to 2000. The law of
motion explained in section II is used thereafter. Huge past changes in the world
economy are introduced as shocks. The collapse of the USSR in 1990 has given
birth to a fast-track opening of Eastern Europe accompanied by an unexpected
and massive write-off of the capital stock. China and India have opened much
faster than before. Furthermore the IT revolution starting in North America led
to a speed up in total factor productivity growth. This higher growth is assumed
to be temporary and will be phased out in the present decade, TFP growth retur-
ning to its long-run average.
The baseline scenario is not easy to depict since it is a dynamic rational expec-
tations general equilibrium, whereby newcomers appear in each period of time.
Any order of description is somewhat arbitrary because it could give the false
impression of a recursive causal system of determination between blocks of rela-
tions. It is just a narrative device in vernacular language.
Regional growth
Assumptions regarding technological convergence are conservative in the
baseline scenario. Besides the parameters that define public pension systems per-
petuate existing policies in the beginning of the XXIst century. Therefore the pat-
tern of the GDP regional growth rates largely follows that of the regional growth
rates of the labour force. Two characteristics stand out (Figure 5). Firstly there
is a general slowdown in growth because the growth rate of the working age
population diminishes in all regions but Africa after 2000. Secondly the disper-
sion in the growth rates is almost as large in 2050 as in 2000, because ageing is
equal to one. This convention allows us to express values in constant dollars. Finally
Walras’s law implies that the world financial market equilibrium is the redundant
equation. This market is automatically cleared.
1. The INGENUE 2 model is presented in a technical document : “A long-term intertemporal
world model for the XXIst century”, Ingenue Team, CEPII Working Paper, 2006, Forthcoming.
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a lengthy process with countervailing impacts on the labour force of less-
developed countries. Nevertheless convergence in total factor productivity has
an impact since the dispersion in the growth rates of the labour force is substan-
tially higher in 2050 than in 2000, while the dispersion in the GDP growth rates
is slightly lower. The Chinese region, which encompasses already developed
countries, is the one where the catching up is the fastest. It is why its growth rate
matches other regions with much higher growth in their labour force.
North America and Europe have growth profiles that partly differ from the
general pattern. In North America growth decelerates precipitously in the first
decade after 2000, because both the labour force and productivity do so. But the
working age population stops declining in 2025, recovers and remains stationary
thereafter. It ensues that GDP growth rate converges to nearly 2% per annum, one
of the highest growth rates in 2050. Europe (both West and East) and worse Rus-
sia have a somber future. Western Europe follows a similar profile to North
America but at much lower growth rates. GDP growth decelerates fast after 2000
until 2030 from 3.2 to 0.7% and keeps this mediocre performance until 2050.
Russia is the region with the lowest growth rate almost throughout the half-
century and ends up in complete stagnation.
Figure 5. GDP Growth rate
Investment and saving
Because the model works at full employment with an exogenous labour force,
the stock of capital in each period is a rising function of employment adjusted
for labour efficiency and of capital intensity (capital/effective labour). The ratio
of capital intensity is itself increasing with TFP and decreasing with the gross
return to capital. The latter is the sum of the regional real interest rate and the
depreciation ratio. Prices enter the picture and they bring the whole system of
intertwined relationships.
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The regional net rate of interest is the sum of the world interest rate, which
clears the world financial market, and of the rate of change of the region’s real
exchange rate against the dollar. Those relationships proceed from the risk-
neutral arbitrage in financial markets. The depreciation ratio is asymmetrically
dependent on the ownership ratio (total wealth of households/capital stock). An
ownership ratio less than one indicates that the region is a net debtor. In those
regions the imperfections of international financial markets raise the cost of capi-
tal the more the larger foreign debt is. It shows up in a higher rate of economic
depreciation of the capital stock. In creditor regions (ownership ratio above one)
the rate of depreciation is a constant, thus independent on financial condition.
Gross investment rises with net capital accumulation and with replacement,
which is modulated by the change in the rate of depreciation in debtor regions.
Therefore in regions with a fast growth of the labour force and high foreign
indebtedness, raising markedly the rate of economic depreciation, the rate of
gross investment to GDP will increase until 2030. Such conditions point out
Africa whose capital starts from a low base. India follows a similar pattern albeit
less strongly. With a constant depreciation ratio, and an interest rate declining
with the world rate, North America keeps a rate of gross investment to GDP
remarkably steady. This is not the case of Japan and Western Europe. Despite
the lowest real interest rates due to the continuous appreciation of their real
exchange rates, leading to a low cost of capital indeed, those regions have such
a declining labour force that it impinges negatively upon capital accumulation.
Yet the rise in capital intensity counteracts the effect of the labour force. It is why
the rate of investment declines less than it does in faster growing regions like
China and South America. Finally Russia has a peculiar profile. There is an
exogenous shock on investment in the early 2000’s. This is the recovery from
the collapse of the 1990’s, which led to the scrapping of more than half of the
capital stock; hence the humped-shape curve of Russian rate of investment,
which remains by far the lowest of all regions (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Evolution of the gross investment to GDP ratio
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Net saving in each region is the aggregate of individual savings in the life
cycle. It depends on the demographic structure (high savers ratio and depen-
dency ratio), on the expectation of future income and on the parameters of the
PAYG pension systems. Demographic determinants are prevalent. Regions with
the fastest-increasing dependency ratios are the ones with the fastest-decreasing
net saving rate, namely Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia. Mean-
while this gloomy demographic factor is compounded with a slow expected pro-
gression in income (Figure 7). In China, India, South America and the
Mediterranean, the high savers ratio and the dependency ratio rise in tandem. In
the early decades, while the population is still young, those regions grow faster
than more demographically mature ones. It follows that young people expecting
higher future income indulge in debt, reducing the overall saving rate. Like for
investment, Africa and North America have more steady saving ratios through-
out the half century.
Figure 7. Evolution of the Net Saving (in percentage of GNP)
Prices
In INGENUE 2 a lot of prices regulate markets. It has already been observed
that the gross rate of return on capital influences capital intensity in each region.
Relative prices of domestic intermediate to final goods and world intermediate
to domestic final goods are factors of competitiveness which determine the share
of domestically-produced intermediate goods and world-imported intermediate
goods contributing to the production of final goods in each region. The domestic
price of final goods is itself a non-linear combination of domestic and world
prices of intermediate goods. The relative price of the domestic intermediate
goods price to the world price, i.e. the terms of trade, determines regional
exports. The world price of intermediate goods is a non-linear average of the
intermediate prices of the different regions. Finally the real exchange rate of a
region relative to North America is the relative price of final goods in this region
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to the price of final goods in North America. Because the North American inter-
mediate price is taken as numeraire and the internal relative price in this region
is roughly constant, one can say that real exchange rates are defined in constant
dollars.
The world real interest rate is declining over the fifty-year period. This is due
to global ageing. Figures 1 and 2 show that the working age population is decele-
rating or declining absolutely while the age group of high savers is growing in
one region after another. As a result the world saving investment equilibrium is
tilted more and more toward a lower equilibrium rate. This downward trend pro-
vides the general profile of regional real interest rates (Figure 8). The hierarchy
of regional real interest rates is linked to the rate of change of the real exchange
rates. The real interest rates regulate investment and saving flows, as explained
here above. The gap between investment and saving is the current account
balance of each region. It is financed by capital flows whose amounts are such
that yield differentials between different regions cancel out in every period.
Figure 8. Regional annual real interest rate
Exchange rates and world finance
The world financial equilibrium allocates capital flows, which finance current
account imbalances modulated by real exchange rate changes. Nevertheless the
equilibrium in financial markets is a stock equilibrium. Net foreign assets affect
exchange rates. They move with the net financial positions of the regions to create
future surpluses or deficits, so that current accounts are balanced in the very long
run, i.e. there is no more accumulation of net foreign assets or debts. In INGENUE
the magnitude of financial positions is measured by the ownership ratio. This is
the ratio of the aggregate wealth accumulated by households in the region to the
capital stock laid out in the region. Hence a ratio above one is tantamount to a
creditor position against the rest of the world, a ratio less than one to a debtor posi-
tion. Despite the general interdependence of prices one can roughly say that the
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world interest rate is the price which equilibrates the world financial market as a
whole, matching total aggregate wealth and world capital stock.
Real exchange rates appreciate relatively to North America in the two regions that
have consistently a ownership ratio higher than North America (Figure 9). Neverthe-
less, except in these two regions and in Russia, the latter due to terms of trade effects,
exchange rate changes are not much sensitive to the stocks of financial assets. The
paths of the exchange rates are mostly parallel to the one of North America.
Figure 9. Evolution of Real Exchange Rate
The ownership ratios are mainly determined by cumulative current account
balances The most striking feature is the divergent profile of North America. It
is due to an assumed change in household behaviour. The deficit in the early
years of the century is, as every one knows, due to the low saving rate of house-
holds in the US. It has been assumed that this behaviour will not be sustainable
in the long run. American households will converge to the saving behaviour
observed in other regions in the early decades. With this structural change and
with a population consistently younger than in Japan and Europe, the rise in
saving in North America is conveyed into a double improvement in the current
account balance (Figure 10) and the ownership ratio.
The main teaching for the other regions is a shrinking of the discrepancies in
current accounts along the half-century. Japan and Western Europe remain con-
tinuously in surplus but less and less with the augmentation of their dependency
ratio. The Mediterranean region is in surplus for most of the time but goes into
a slight deficit in the last two decades. Africa, India and Eastern Europe, with
large current account deficits at the start of the century, are reducing it as long
as their growth rate is diminishing and their households save more because they
get older and richer.
Ownership ratios do not show the same converging pattern, because regions
accumulate either net foreign assets or debts because the sign of the current
account balance does not change along the fifty year period. It was observed on
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figure 10, which depicts current account balances as a percentage of world GDP,
that the polarisation between creditor and debtor regions will persist with the
notable exception of North America. Therefore the profiles of the ownership
ratio do not exhibit any convergence. The building of a strong creditor position
in North America stands out. The slight improvement in the debtor position of
Africa and Eastern Europe stems from the steady reduction of the deficit in those
two regions. In India, where the improvement is less pronounced, the ownership
ratio is continuously deteriorating. India will become the largest debtor accor-
ding to this measure in the last decade before 2050.
Figure 10. Evolution of Current Account Balance (percentage of World GDP)
Figure 11. Ownership Ratio
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Foreign trade
In INGENUE tradable goods are intermediary. Regions export on a world mar-
ket where a fictive world producer “produces” a world intermediate good. They
compete on their domestic markets against imports of the world intermediate
goods. Therefore the competitiveness of each region depends on the terms of
trade against the world producer whose price is itself an average of intermediate
goods prices in the different regions.
Figure 12. Terms of Trade
Figure 13. Evolution of Trade Balance (percentage or regional GDP)
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Three regions have ever-rising terms of trade, i.e. loss of competitiveness:
Japan, Western Europe, Russia. The other regions have constant or slightly
declining terms of trade (figure 12). The weak growth in the three former
regions, much weaker than in others (Figure 5), pushes prices upwards. In Japan
and Western Europe those rising prices generate the widening trade deficit to
match the demand of intermediate goods by the final goods sector. (Figure 13).
In Russia the population declines more than anywhere else and the consumption
per capita is lower. Furthermore Russian intermediary products are primary
commodities in strong world demand. It ensues that the valuing effect of the
terms of trade takes over. After deteriorating alongside Japan and Western
Europe, the Russian trade balance turns around to an increasing surplus there-
after. Most other regions with little change in competitiveness improve their
trade balance, moving from deficit to surplus.
ALTERNATIVE PROSPECTS IN THE RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD
The baseline scenario has shown the salient feature of Western Europe in the
first half of the XXIst century. It is an ageing region, most advanced in the demo-
graphic transition. It benefits from globalisation as a perennial creditor region.
European growth will get lower and lower. But the accumulated wealth of its
household will give them the opportunity to draw a permanent income from the
rest of the world on its ownership of foreign asset. But it is well-known that the
public pension scheme in Western Europe is expensive. Different scenarios have
already been studied with INGENUE 1, involving policy reforms within Western
Europe. They were conceived to diminish the cost of financing retirement bene-
fits, either in limiting the social contribution rate or in boosting growth via the
postponement of the retirement age. Another view is improving the benefits that
Western Europe draws from its relationships with the rest of the world.
Since the frontiers of a larger Europe are not well-defined, it might be relevant
to assess the consequences of tighter links between Western Europe and regions
wrongly or rightly perceived to be in its backyard. One such structural change is
already in motion. It is the tentative economic integration of always more remote
territories. Another fashionable view is the opening to larger flows of migrants
from nearby territories.
Studying these alternative scenarios within the INGENUE framework is not that
easy however. In its present version INGENUE 2 is not fitted to simulate the con-
sequences of privileged trade links with some outer regions rather than others.
Technically such a scenario would entail modifications in some of the equations,
not only changes in exogenous parameters. Given the complexity of the dynamic
resolution in this forward-looking general equilibrium model, the exercise, while
feasible, would have been too time-consuming to be implemented right away.
On the contrary, privileged demographic links, i.e. immigration to Western
Europe coming preferentially from neighbour regions; involve exogenous
changes in the upstream demographic model and are immediately feasible.
Considering those technical constraints two types of alternative scenarios are
analysed below. The first is a faster technological convergence in Eastern
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Europe. It might be justified by an economic dynamism launched by the prospect
of the participation to a larger economic community. But the positive conse-
quences of enhancing growth in Eastern Europe are diffused worldwide instead
of being preferentially directed towards Western Europe. Since Eastern Europe
is such a small economic region, its impact on Western Europe is weak. Most
interesting is the impact on Eastern Europe itself, due to the multiple linkages
with the world economy that are modelled in INGENUE 2.
The second scenario explores labour force immigration into Western Europe
originated preferentially, but not fully, in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterra-
nean. The advocates of such policies have no ideas on the order of magnitude of
the economic effects and do not care about the dire effects of the population
haemorrhage on the countries exporting their labour force. Therefore this first
exercise with the INGENUE 2 model delivers results which are a matter of concern.
Faster convergence in Eastern Europe
In sharp contrast with the baseline scenario, a catching up of Eastern Europe
total factor productivity to the level of Western Europe is assumed over the
course of the XXIst century (Figure 14). If it can be sustained the speed-up in TFP
growth will also mark a deep change from the laggard stance of productivity in
the last three decades of the XXth century. Therefore this hypothetical gain in
productive efficiency is by no means a prevision. It is rather a representation of
the wishful thinking of the EC Commission, where it is fashionable to expect that
the enlargement of the European market can make wonders.
Figure 14. Total Factor Productivity: 1960-2100 (percentage of “North America” level)
Assuming that the trend in TFP will move upward as soon as the countries
involved enter the EC and that the future evolution to a complete catching-up is
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expected, GDP growth rate will jump 1% above the growth rate in the baseline
scenario. It will then slow down steadily, but stay above baseline growth well
after 2050 (Figure 15).
Figure 15. GDP Growth rate (difference from baseline scenario)
The dynamic can be easily understood. On the supply side a permanent higher
TFP increases labour productivity; hence production since the labour force is
fully employed. On the demand side it entails an expectation of higher future
income. The latter induces households to diminish saving and raise consumption.
As a consequence the average private consumption per capita jumps immedia-
tely higher in consistency with the forward-looking view of households. Then it
rises systematically above its baseline level.
A higher growth profile requires capital accumulation. With a lag of one
period, investment growth follows GDP growth: it jacks up 1.7% ahead of the
baseline rate of growth. The gap shrinks steadily thereafter but remains positive
until 2050. The slowdown in investment growth is regulated by the cost of capi-
tal. Because domestic saving does not match investment needs, net saving
actually being under baseline until 2025, an inflow of foreign capital fills in the
gap in the investment saving balance. It is attracted by a higher interest rate in
Eastern Europe. It follows a hump-shaped profile with a maximum in 2015
(Figure 16).
The foreign accounts of Eastern Europe are regulated by the real exchange
rate and by the terms of trade. Both prices diminish relative to baseline. The real
exchange rate depreciates as long as the regional real interest rate is higher than
the world interest rate. The depreciation is fostered by the hypothetical conver-
gence in TFP which lowers domestic prices. The same impact, admittedly ampli-
fied, arises on the terms of trade. The improved competitiveness will boost
exports and mitigate imports. Therefore the trade balance and the current account
balance show the same profile.
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Figure 16. Regional annual real interest rate 
(Percentage point difference from baseline scenario)
In the first two decades the rise in both consumption and investment calls for
higher imports of intermediate goods financed by capital inflows. The trade
balance turns negative relative to the baseline scenario, because exports are dis-
couraged and imports stimulated by the strong domestic demand. After about
two decades the investment saving balance swings to an inverted pattern. As
explained above the investment growth rate slows down steadfastly while the
working age population diminishes. People take advantage of their higher real
income to save more. Both the trade and the current account balances turn to sur-
plus (Figure 17). As a result the ownership ratio relative to baseline scenario
exhibits a U curve with a minimum around 2020 (figure 18).
Figure 17. Evolution of Trade Balance (percentage of regional GDP) 
(difference from baseline scenario)
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Figure 18. Ownership Ratio (Percentage point difference from baseline scenario)
Labour migration from the East and the South
The second alternative scenario has another aim. It is to shed some insight in
the debate about immigration into Western Europe. (Héran [2002]). In the base-
line scenario Western Europe has the highest social security contribution rate in
the world. It is due to the relatively high replacement ratio people enjoy at cons-
tant policy and to the highest dependency ratio. The contribution rate is expected
to increase steadily from 17% in 2000 to 32% in 2050. Meanwhile the depen-
dency ratio will rise from 43% of the working age population to 98%.
Amongst the policies to alleviate the financial burden on the public retirement
system, immigration rides high in the mind of UN and Euro technocrats. Some
political leaders seam also ready to embrace the idea that an influx of migrants
is the best way to save the European welfare system. Let us notice that this policy
stance is quite at odds with the mutually beneficial intergenerational exchange
upheld in the INGENUE project. We do think that the first best way is to enhance
a world growth regime via intense technology transfers at low cost and sustained
capital exports. In the present stage of capitalist development the opportunity
raised by the growing labour force in the most populated regions of the world
should be met. According to this perspective it is questionable to draw flows of
labour out of their countries.
However the INGENUE model is fit to describe the consequences of migrations
on both the regions receiving and losing the migrants. The scenario is conceived
as follows. It defines the flows of migrants so that the projected decline of the
working age population in Western Europe is cancelled out. It will adjust to the
last stage of the wave shock generated by the baby boom while the numerous
cohorts have toppled over the retirement age. Therefore the immigration flow
implied by the assumption of constant labour force in Western Europe will rise
sharply from 2005 (supposing the policy starts at this date) to the years 2025-
2030. It will reach roughly 12 millions migrants for the 5-year period; It will
abate thereafter because the demographic transition expects the fertility rate to
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recover so that constant reproduction of the generations is achieved. The flow of
immigration will disappear altogether around 2080 (Figure 19).
Figure 19. Migrations flows into Western Europe
The migrants are supposed to be young adults who adjust to the productivity
of the host region as soon as enter the labour force. When the flow of migrants
prolonged those observed in the 1996-2000 data, the migratory flows during the
first decade 2005-2014 represent 1,1% of the initial population (in 2000) in Eas-
tern Europe, 0,5% in the Mediterranean world and 0,2% in Africa. This is much
less than the emigration from Europe in the last decade of the XIXth century.
When the flow is normatively designed to smooth out the effect of the baby boom
on the decline of the labour force, a larger proportion is supposed to come from
the Mediterranean and Africa which are the most populated in the vicinity of
Western Europe. 11% of total migrants will come from Eastern Europe, 32%
from the Mediterranean, 25% from Africa, 32% from the rest of the world.
Domestic consequences of migrations
As defined to smooth out the working age population in Western Europe, the
scenario has a large impact since it lowers the dependency ratio in 2050 from
about 1 in the baseline scenario to 0.65. It follows that the financing of the PAYG
system is dramatically improved. The social security contribution rate falls con-
tinuously in percentage of baseline. This means that in 2050 the contribution rate
is only 24% in the high migration variant against 32% in the baseline, because
migrants contribute massively to its financing. It is a huge improvement. Indeed
the deterioration of the contribution ratio would be only 7%, since it amounts to
17% in 2000.
The impact on the growth rate is substantial. The inflow of young workers
expecting higher wages boosts consumption, which spurs a speed up in the
growth rate until 2030 where it is 1% higher than in the baseline scenario. Then
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the stock of earlier migrants enters the high saving stage of their life cycle. The
increase in saving moderates consumption and the growth rate flattens but at 1%
above baseline until 2050 (figure 20).
The mirror effect of the improving economic situation in Western Europe due
to immigration is a limited deterioration in the two main regions of emigration:
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The magnitude of the deterioration
depends on the loss of potential workers relative to the total of the labour force
in the region. It is why in Eastern Europe, a region much advanced in ageing and
already suffering from a declining population, the adverse consequences of emi-
gration are more critical.
Figure 20. GDP Growth rate (difference from baseline scenario)
Nevertheless the level of consumption per capita is less than in the baseline
scenario in Western Europe until the very end of the half-century. The reason
lies in the production sector. The inflow of workers reduces capital intensity rela-
tive to baseline. The marginal productivity of capital is raised and the interest
rate as well. Conversely labour productivity is diminished with a lower capital
intensity. The real wage rate, being a decreasing function of the return on capital
on the factor price frontier, is itself on a slower path than in baseline. It ensues
that relatively to the baseline scenario consumption is less augmented than total
population; hence consumption per capita is lower. Around 2030, when saving
gains momentum the interest rate recedes a bit because saving grows faster than
investment. Furthermore figure 19 shows that the flow of new migrants will be
receding fast after 2030. Therefore the growth of consumption per capita relative
to baseline turns positive from 2025 onwards. The level moves upward again but
does not overtake baseline before 2045 (figure 21).
The opposite occurs in emigrating regions. But the impact is diffused over
several regions and mitigated by the size of the labour force. The modest fall in
the interest rate and the subsequent increase in productivity persists for almost
the entire span of the fifty year period. Only Eastern Europe and the Mediterra-
nean exhibit a non-negligible elevation of consumption per capita.
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Figure 21. Consumption per capita (level) (Percentage point difference from baseline scenario)
Migrations and the foreign accounts
Because of the rise in interest rate, the saving investment balance stays more in
surplus than in the baseline scenario. The current account balance, which was
already in surplus in baseline (figure 10), is therefore more so. The real exchange rate
is depreciated relative to baseline since the real interest rate is higher. Yet it still
appreciates slightly during the half-century. It follows from the improvement of the
current account balance that Western Europe reinforces its creditor position in the
world economy. The ownership ratio rises systematically above baseline. The
regions of emigration with slightly appreciating exchange rates relative to baseline
stay more in deficit and more in debt. The change in the trade account balance is more
pronounced. It reflects the scissors effect in the saving investment balance due to the
inverted U-shape of migration flows. Therefore the trade balance is negative then
positive relative to baseline in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean (Figure 22).
Figure 22. Evolution of Trade Balance (percentage of regional GDP) 
(difference from baseline scenario)
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CONCLUSION
In the next half-century Europe is likely to be a low-growth region, because
of its adverse demographic profile and its slow progression in total factor pro-
ductivity. Nevertheless it will benefit from the advance of globalisation. Being
one of the two regions (with Japan) where real interest rates are persistently the
lowest, Western Europe will be a permanent creditor, accumulating net foreign
assets for the whole half-century. Its real exchange rate will also appreciate con-
sistently. Therefore European households will gain from globalisation in both
income drawn from the yield of their foreign assets and in purchasing power rela-
tive to other regions. It is why consumption per capita measured at PPP will take
over North America after 2015 and rise thereafter in sympathy with real
exchange rate appreciation.
The baseline scenario is conservative however. It does not embody a signifi-
cant acceleration in the catching-up process, except to some extent in China and
India. The world-wide consequences of a much faster increase in TFP would
change the pattern of world growth dramatically. This world growth scenario
will be left to further study. In the present paper it was illustrated by an hypo-
thetical catching-up in the small region of Eastern Europe. As soon as it occurs,
the structural change in production entails a jump in the growth rate in the
forward-looking framework of INGENUE. Growth must be supported by capital
accumulation financed by capital inflows attracted by the rise in interest rate. The
reversal of capital flows will come later when people get richer and save more
while the growth rate declines steadily.
The former scenario illustrates the virtue of capital mobility and technological
diffusion with the proviso that investments to assimilate technological progress
are efficient in the importing country. This scenario must be contrasted with
international labour mobility. Migration flows boost growth in the importing
region but weaken it in the exporting ones. They also pull apart the financing of
the public pension system as much as migrants are young productive adults.
Therefore even if the migrants themselves might be better off, migration is a
mechanism to redistribute wealth in favour of the richer regions at odds with a
world growth regime.
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